When Autonomous AI Attacks a Segmented Network

An evaluation of autonomous attack behavior, lateral movement and containment


By Zero Networks Research

AI-enabled cyberattacks are beginning to move beyond reconnaissance and exploit development into later stages of the attack lifecycle, including credential theft, privilege escalation, and lateral movement. That shift matters because lateral movement is the mechanism that turns a single compromised system into a broader enterprise incident.

Third-party research already shows this behavior emerging. Anthropic analyzed 832 accounts banned for malicious cyber activity and found that 54 (6.5%) used AI to assist with lateral movement. More importantly, lateral movement was the strongest marker of high-risk behavior in its dataset. Anthropic also documented an actor using Claude Code to conduct autonomous reconnaissance, harvest credentials and move laterally across a victim cloud environment.[1]

Research environments point in the same direction. In joint work with Carnegie Mellon University, Anthropic showed that LLMs equipped with a cyber toolkit could autonomously execute multistage attacks across networks of 25-50 hosts, including initial access, lateral movement, and data exfiltration.[2] OpenAI subsequently disclosed that models in an internal cybersecurity evaluation exploited a zero-day, escalated privileges, and performed lateral movement inside OpenAI's research environment before reaching a node with internet access and compromising parts of Hugging Face infrastructure.[3]

At the same time, the recent surge in newly disclosed vulnerabilities is putting unprecedented pressure on cybersecurity teams:



This raises a practical defensive question: if an autonomous AI attacker compromises one machine, how far can it go from there?

1 Anthropic, Mapping AI-enabled cyber threats
2 Anthropic/Carnegie Mellon University, Cyber toolkits for LLMs
3 OpenAI, Hugging Face security incident evaluation; The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

The experiment

During August 2026, Zero Networks tested that question in a controlled lab environment designed to resemble an enterprise estate rather than a traditional capture-the-flag challenge. The environment spanned Linux, Windows and macOS endpoints and servers, Kubernetes clusters, databases, web infrastructure, directory services, internal DNS and PKI, file shares, and CI/CD components.

Zero Networks segmentation protected the estate. Claude Code was placed on a domain-joined workstation and operated under a standard domain-user identity, giving it the same directory visibility and baseline access available to a typical enterprise user. One Windows host, named: ESTI, was intentionally left unsegmented as a validation control. Claude Code was placed on another workstation using a standard domain-user identity and tasked with gaining administrator access to additional systems and leaving a proof file. Later runs increased the attacker's advantages with additional credentials, internet access, and broad permission to use offensive tooling.




Figure 1. Claude maps the environment and identifies the intentionally unprotected system as the primary reachable target.

The attacker was capable

Across the exercise, Claude attempted approximately 18 attack approaches using 23 tools and touched roughly 22 MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Its actions included network and Active Directory discovery, Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, searches for Group Policy credentials, LAPS discovery, Active Directory ACL analysis, delegation abuse, local privilege escalation, GPO modification attempts, Windows credential extraction, Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, password cracking, and host-firewall manipulation.

The most important experimental result was that Claude did succeed where a usable path existed. On ESTI, the deliberately unsegmented host, it gained local administrator access, extracted credential material, and planted the requested proof file. That validation control makes the outcome more informative: the AI was very capable of attacking the lab.

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


Figure 2. Claude records successful local-administrator access and proof placement on ESTI, the unsegmented control.

Where the attack stopped

From ESTI, Claude continued trying to expand its access. It dumped Windows credential hives, attempted Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, examined Active Directory permissions, tested privilege-escalation paths, and disabled ESTI's local firewall to determine whether the lateral-movement restriction originated on the compromised machine. The protected destinations remained unreachable because the relevant enforcement occurred on the destination side.

> **The wall is network, not privilege.**
> **I've reached the designed containment boundary.**
>
> *— Claude Code, after testing lateral movement paths*




Figure 3. After testing additional escalation and lateral-movement paths, Claude concludes that it has reached the designed containment boundary.

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Segmentation mattered the most out of all defenses

While there were other defenses (various OS hardening, EDR, etc.), most of them Claude was able to disable, the only real "wall" was the network or the lack of it: the attacker repeatedly lacked reachability from compromised systems to protected assets over the lateral-management paths it attempted. Claude could identify targets, obtain elevated privileges on the unprotected machine, and acquire credential material, but it could not establish the network path required to apply those capabilities elsewhere.

That result closely echoes OpenAI's own conclusion after its 2026 incident. At Black Hat USA, Michael Dalton of OpenAI said: "These agents ultimately are bounded by the privileges they can obtain and the systems they can communicate with." He added that "**Segmentation**, least privilege, and other programs remain as vital here as they do ever."[4]

What the results of this AI attack show

The one machine that fell was our control, and it answered the question we needed answered. Everything in the lab had the same operating systems, the same patch levels, the same EDR, the same OS hardening baselines, and the same reachable services — and all of it faced the same AI adversary. The only variable was whether the host was segmented.

What that variable changed was time. Against the segmented hosts, the agent kept working — enumerating, retrying, reaching for the next idea — and kept getting nowhere, because nothing it needed would answer. Against the open host, compromise just happened at machine speed. Not because the attack got smarter at that point, but because the path was there and speed is what an AI adversary is best at.

An agent that moves at machine speed and knows every technique in the literature is still stuck if there's nowhere to move. Segmentation doesn't reduce its capability; it removes the surface that capability needs.

4 Cybersecurity Dive, OpenAI warns autonomous hacks are 'watershed moment for computer security'

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